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Targeting the Minority: A New Theory of Diversionary Violence

Nathaniel M. Arnold
Wright State University

TARGETING THE MINORITY: A NEW THEORY OF DIVERSIONARY VIOLENCE

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By

NATHANIEL M. ARNOLD
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I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY Nathaniel M. Arnold ENTITLED Targeting the Minority: A New Theory of Diversionary Violence BE ACCEPTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF Master of Arts.

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Liam Anderson, Ph.D.
Thesis Director

_____
Laura M. Luehrmann, Ph.D.
Director, Master of Arts Program in International and Comparative Politics

Committee on Final Examination:

_____
Liam Anderson, Ph.D.
School of Public and International Affairs

_____
Carlos Costa, Ph.D.
School of Public and International Affairs

_____
Vaughn Shannon, Ph.D.
Academic Department

_____
Barry Milligan, Ph.D.
Interim Dean of the Graduate School

ABSTRACT

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Targeting the Minority: A New Theory of Diversionary Violence.

This research develops a novel theory for domestic diversionary violence, contending that the main drivers for this type of conflict are the specific characteristics of state-targeted domestic minority groups. Seven new variables measuring minority group characteristics are identified through a case study of the Kurdish minority in the Turkish Republic, then applied to a quantitative analysis of domestic diversionary violence in a dataset of 284 observations across 117 countries during the years 2004-2005, utilizing data from the University of Maryland's Minorities at Risk Project, the University of Illinois Cline Center SPEED Database, and World Bank. A proportional odds logistic regression model shows that the minority group's recent grievances with the base population and its geographic concentration have statistically significant positive correlations to the likelihood of targeting for diversionary violence, while the protest level of the minority group achieves a statistically significant negative correlation.

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List of Acronyms

AKP: Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*), Turkey

COW: Correlates of War Database

CSES: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems

DDTS: Domestic Diversionary Target Selection Theory

DWT: Diversionary War Theory

DYP: True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi)*, Turkey

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

GMM: Generalized Method of Moments

HRW: Human Rights Watch

IGO: International Governmental Organization

KDP: Kurdistan Democratic Party (Iraq)

KPE: Kurdish Party in Exile

LTTE: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Sri Lanka)

MAR: Minority at Risk

MID: Militarized Interstate Dispute

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO: Non-Governmental Organization

PKK: Worker's Party of Kurdistan (*Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane*), Turkey

PRC: People's Republic of China

PUK: Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (Iraq)

SHP: Social Democratic Populist Party (*Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti*), Turkey

SPEED: Social, Political, and Economic Event Database (Cline Center, University of Illinois)

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Я очень тебя люблю.

Dedication

For my wife, Iuliia.

I. Introduction

The resurgence of nationalism and populist regimes across much of the world in recent years has compelled a return to research on how these governments function and how their interstate relations differ from other regime types. Concurrently, an increase in the visibility of violence involving nationalist regimes makes conflict literature involving such states particularly significant (Schrock-Jacobson 2012; Solt 2011; Shelef 2016; Pillar 2013). While neither nationalism nor conflict are new paradigms to the study of international relations, recent publications on the subjects indicate their continued relevance. The cornerstone of diversionary war theory (DWT) is the unifying potential of militarized conflict and the nationalist sentiment it evokes. Diversionary violence is therefore a critical field for understanding the mechanics of nationalism and conflict. How do governments divert popular attention from unpopular domestic policies? What impact does an economic slowdown have on the likelihood of conflict under a nationalist regime? Which groups are the most likely targets for diversionary tactics? These questions are vital, because they have immediate bearing on ongoing crises. The persecution of the ethnic minority Uighur population in China may be taking place to signal strength to a domestic audience (Kanat 2016). The violence taking place in eastern Ukraine may divert attention from economic woes at home in Russia (Bebler 2015).

Diversionary war theory is based on the intuitive concept that some governments use violence to distract critical bases of support from unpopular domestic conditions. Most contributions to the body of literature on this subject have focused on the frequency of diversionary wars within the larger set of militarized interstate disputes and the variables that determine their outcome. The focus here is on how ethnic minority groups shape *domestic* diversionary conflicts by examining the characteristics of targeted groups. A new model is constructed to evaluate internal state conditions with the goal of determining the circumstances

in which domestic groups are most likely to become the target of diversionary violence by state leadership. This predictive model measures a novel set of variables that inform a state's decision to exploit domestic turmoil through diversionary tactics. After the first principles that inform the hypotheses are defined, the state's diversionary target selection process is analyzed in the case of Turkey's relationship with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) through the 1980s and 1990s to establish the causal mechanisms impacting the diversionary process. Finally, a quantitative analysis of domestic diversionary violence is developed based on the identified variables.

The protest level of a minority group, its geographic concentration, and the presence of recent grievances between it and the state are all novel conditions identified here as having an impact on a minority group's likelihood of being targeted by the state. Monitoring these conditions prior to the onset of domestic diversionary violence may help identify minorities at risk of being targeted earlier, in turn reducing the risk of violence occurring by providing international support for the targeted minority group. These crucial insights also provide direction and greater depth to the existing literature by exploring the impact of these variables which were previously unaccounted for. They furthermore reveal links between diversionary war theory and other bodies of social science literature. These new perspectives reframe diversionary war theory, giving it wider application in diagnosing domestic unrest and paving the way for future research into diversionary violence.

II. Theories of Diversionary War

Traditional diversionary war theory forms the basis of all diversionary war literature. It argues that states sometimes engage in conflict not only over differences of opinion or strategic needs, but to distract from internal pressures caused by poor economic performance, in-group/out-group tensions, low public opinion about regime leadership, or other civil unrest (Levi 1998). Adherents to diversionary war theory contend that popular unrest and economic distress can incentivize state leadership to engage in a militarized interstate dispute (MID) to divert the public's attention and stave off their removal from power (Boulding 1962; Oneal and Tir 2006; Weeks 2012; Morgan and Anderson 1999). The existential threat from domestic unrest is strong enough to encourage leaders to pursue international disputes as an alternative to regime change.

Confirming that regimes actually do seek out interstate diversionary wars is difficult, as several counterarguments exist. A quick look at the prevailing literature reveals a plethora of dissenting research and a complex discourse regarding DWT's modern applicability. For example, it seems intuitive that regimes encourage international conflict to maintain their popularity domestically, causing a rally around the flag effect, but there has been much contention about the significance of this effect, and whether ensuing failure might cause a reciprocal drop in popularity for the state leader, negating any positive impact (Oneal and Brian 1995). There is disagreement over the kinds of domestic problems that lead to diversionary war, specifically the importance of economic instability (Oneal and Tir 2006). The idea that general unpopularity incentivizes regimes to pursue diversionary conflict is refuted by Morgan and Bickers (1992), who contend that dissent from critical groups within a regime's support coalition is far more influential on state leaders than general dissent among the populace.

Although the basis for diversionary war theory dates back hundreds of years, its empirical confirmation has proven elusive. As Gelpi (1997: 257) states, "The lack of any general support

for the diversionary hypothesis has led scholars to think about the conditions in which diversionary conflicts might occur." For this reason, the contemporary literature on diversionary war theory has focused on three categories of research: isolating causes of diversionary conflict (Oneal and Tir 2006; Morgan and Bickers 1992; Powell 2014), determining which types of regimes are most likely to engage in diversionary violence (Weeks 2012; Kisangani and Pickering 2009; Kisangani and Pickering 2011; Pickering and Kisangani 2005; Pickering and Kisangani 2010) and building empirical confirmation of the theory (Morgan & Anderson 1999; Tir 2010; Gibler and Hutchison 2013). Through establishing subcategories for diversionary conflict, determining what conditions lead to the conflict, and establishing correlation through empirical analysis, these authors have all attempted to clarify diversionary war theory, amending the causal mechanisms or variables analyzed in the datasets while maintaining DWT's theoretical integrity.

Isolating Causes

DWT relies upon basic assumptions about state interactions and constraints on the capabilities of state leaders. At its core, the theory posits that states benefit from distracting their citizenry from domestic or internal problems or crises. This occurs regardless of governmental system type; both democracies and autocratic governments engage in diversionary wars. Indeed, much of the early literature on DWT focuses on American involvement in this type of conflict (Oneal and Bryan 1995).

While the main benefit of diversionary war is to distract from domestic concerns, a secondary benefit is a surge in the popularity of state leaders, what might be called a bleedover effect in which state leaders benefit from a sudden surge in nationalist sentiment. These assumptions have most notably been challenged by Oneal and Bryan (1995), who argue that the increase in popularity from engaging in a conflict does not outweigh the inevitable unpopularity

caused by the damage to the economy by the costly nature of war, and the potential for damage to the country from counterattacks or international intervention. The theory also assumes that states that lose an interstate diversionary conflict reap all the costs and few, if any, of the benefits initially envisioned. The authors also assume state leaders are rational actors seeking the greatest possible benefit from a conflict, so they will engage in diversionary conflicts with only the strongest possibility of success, minimizing the risk of failure (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Hence, in a scenario with multiple potential diversionary conflicts, the risk of war will be greater for those actors with less powerful militaries than the aggressor state. This increases the aggressor state's chance of success. States with low power projection capabilities benefit more from engaging in regional conflicts or with bordering states, because the cost of engaging in war increases exponentially with distance from home (Boulding 1962). Control of territory is also postulated to be a contributing factor to targeting for a diversionary war. If state leadership is considering instigating a diversionary war, they have a greater likelihood of targeting a state which holds territory that the aggressor state wishes to reclaim because territorial reclamation may be a more universally appealing rationale to the public than other reasons for conflict (Tir 2010).

Regime Type

While all governments are capable of pursuing a diversionary conflict, Pickering and Kisangani (2005: 23) find through analyzing conflicts from 1950 to 1996 that "...[M]ature democracies, consolidating autocracies, and transitional polities are the only regime types prone to this type of force." This list appears to include more types of government than it excludes, reinforcing the idea that this type of conflict can occur anywhere. Kisangani and Pickering (2011: 1023-24) also draw a distinction between the more benevolent mission of the democratic regime's intervention and the hostile, outwardly repressive nature of authoritarian diversionary

violence. They argue that democratic regimes are more prone to intervening abroad via "benevolent military force," which they define as "socioeconomic intervention" like humanitarian aid and defending minorities. Autocratic regimes, they contend, are more inclined to instigate "politicostrategic" military operations without a benevolent or humanitarian mission, designed, for example, to improve their standing in the regional balance of power. Tir and Jasinski (2008) contend that diversionary violence is more likely to occur in less developed states, perhaps because the diversionary in-group outbidding process is more vociferous in less stable democratic states, though this implication is not discussed at any length.

Empirical Confirmation

Building empirical confirmation through analysis of large data sets has been essential to the study of diversionary war. Morgan and Anderson (1999) show that in Great Britain between 1950 and 1992, public support for government increased when the state leadership used or threatened military force abroad. In examining the impact of "competency costs," or the negative effects associated with failure to meet policy goals, Gelpi and Grieco (2015) review a data set containing 769 legislative bills considered by the United States Congress to determine that the president's performance during a MID had an impact on their legislative success. This indicates that for state leadership, meeting wartime objectives is essential to also realizing domestic policy goals. Oneal and Tir (2006) utilize a data set measuring interstate conflicts from 1921 to 2001 to confirm that domestic economic deterioration influences a state's involvement in a diversionary war, though they are rare. MIDs are correlated to economic instability and domestic political unrest by Kisangani and Pickering (2009) using generalized method of moments (GMM) models. Gibler and Hutchison (2013) investigate 369 cases of conflict to show the importance of territorial dispute in identifying diversionary conflict. To record the correlation between economic concerns and public opinions on foreign policy priorities, Tir and Singh (2013) use

CSES Module II surveys. In order to isolate wars from other conflicts in the data set reviewed, Powell (2014) sets new parameters for the scale and severity of the conflict. These empirical studies have shown that economic factors, foreign policy, public opinion, and territorial disputes affect diversionary war theory. However, all of these studies focus exclusively on evaluating MIDs.

Domestic Diversionary Theory

Despite significant efforts to establish empirical evidence that diversionary wars do in fact occur, the results have been inconclusive. Scholars have attempted to reframe the theory in order to increase the number of cases from which evidence could be drawn, with some success. Tir and Jasinski's (2008) groundbreaking work follows Levy's (1998) conjecture that by focusing on *domestic* diversionary conflicts, evidence of diversionary conflict is more prevalent given that there are fewer risks associated with targeting an ethnic group domestically rather than another sovereign state. Ethnic groups are the focus of their study because they are assumed to have strong social ties and kinship that the state leadership may play up as evidence of their questionable loyalty to the state. As the authors (Tir and Jasinski 2008: 644) state,

> Expanding on this idea, we note that because individuals may identify themselves with an ethnic group as strongly as if not more so than with a state, certain segments of the society may feel a greater affinity to their own group or even to another state than to the state of which they are nominally citizens. This means that the embattled leader's constituency often does not include the entire population of the state; rather, it is limited to a particular ethnic group or groups. In these cases, we argue, the ethnic minorities outside the in-group constituency may play the role of enemy outsiders quite effectively.

Their analysis provides a compelling correlation between domestic problems affecting state leaders and conflicts targeting ethnic minorities. The state pursuing domestic diversionary violence eschews the likelihood of international intervention on behalf of multi-state institutions and potentially appears less threatening to bordering states. By targeting an ethnic minority

domestically, there is not only lower risk of reprisal (perhaps an existential threat), but also the potential to create a blame game in which the minority group could be held responsible for failures originating with the state leader.

The concept stemming from ethnic instrumentalism known as "scapegoating," (Glaser 1958) has a close connection to domestic diversionary theory. Glaser (1958: 31) defines an ethnic group as, "…racial, national, or religious groups." This separates a defined ethnic group from other related expressions, like ethnic identification or orientation, which refer more specifically to an individual's sentiments regarding their ethnic identity. This is a more or less standard definition for ethnic group, but an important distinction for the purposes of domestic diversionary theory, where specific ethnic minorities, ethnic "groups," are the locus of diversionary violence. Glaser defines scapegoating in a sociological context. Describing the tendencies of authoritarian personality types, Glaser (1958: 38) states, "…[H]is delusions of persecution may find expression in scapegoating out-groups, or he may achieve a sense of security through identification with in-groups." The author contests that out-groups may be blamed for problems impacting the in-group, an essential element to the scapegoating concept. Domestic diversionary theory specifies that conflict is the result of this scapegoating (Tir and Jasinski 2008), and not simply other less violent forms of repression, though the implications of this are not considered. Tir and Jasinski (2008) attempt to establish empirical evidence of the connection between diversionary war and domestic ethnic minorities, arguing that the social science theory of in-group vs. out-group conflict lends itself more intuitively to domestic diversionary trends than those involving MIDs. By ostracizing a specific minority group, especially one involved in lasting, historical domestic tensions, the state leader runs a much lower risk of international intervention, particularly if the diversionary violence is not a frequent occurrence.

Coser (1956) stipulates the advantages of in-group vs. out-group conflict in a sociological context, but the basic concept of a contest between in-group bidders competing for control over the out-group scapegoating narrative is foundational to domestic diversionary theory. As in-group factions competing for power in the state system see state leadership's rhetoric and antiminority narrative, they compete to top each other's prejudicial actions in order to signal to state leadership that they are supportive of the scapegoating action. This snowballs into a diversionary narrative that shifts the blame for unpopular domestic issues to the out-group (Devotta 2005).

Domestic diversionary theory represents an intriguing and innovative approach to some common themes within the existing diversionary literature. It connects the social science constructs of in-group/out-group conflict and in-group political outbidding with established theories on ethnic minority identity and domestic political constraints to create a cohesive, intuitive narrative for diversionary state actions (Devotta 2005; Cederman 2015; Lawoti 2007; Gagnon 1995). Domestic diversionary theory is the jumping-off point for this article, as I construct "domestic diversionary target selection theory," which extrapolates from the existing traditions of the diversionary literature to determine which conditions within a minority group determine its likelihood of being marginalized as an out-group and targeted for diversionary violence.

Domestic Diversionary Target Selection Theory

Domestic diversionary target selection theory (DDTS) follows the same straightforward causal logic as traditional diversionary war theory—state leadership begins to lose popularity in critical bases of support due to economic duress or unpopular domestic policy. Being the rational political utility maximizers that state leaders are, they counter this drop in popularity and any removal from power that may result by constructing a narrative in which a domestic minority

becomes the scapegoat, blamed for the wider problems that the state is facing. By targeting a group perceived as outside or different from the base population, the state leader not only deflects the majority's discontent but also identifies a common adversary for the majority group. The surge in nationalism that results acts as a buoy for state leader popularity while unifying the base. Any expense accrued as the result of this conflict can actually help the state leadership's narrative, as the conflict can be construed as the minority's fault, and the expense just more fuel to the fire of nationalism. Any casualties in the base population can similarly benefit state leadership by confirming that the targeted minority was indeed a threat. Constraints exist, of course—the state leadership must be careful not to instigate a conflict with a minority group powerful enough to overwhelm state military capabilities and mire the state in a more serious conflict, for example.

At this point, however, DDTS departs from the existing diversionary theories in a number of important ways. Where Pickering and Kisangani (2005), Levy (1998), and Tir and Jasinski (2008) have primarily focused on the international conditions, regime characteristics, and domestic economic situation most conducive to diversionary violence occurring, DDTS instead takes the novel approach of focusing exclusively on the minority group characteristics that increase its likelihood of being targeted by the state. In cases where a "minority at risk (MAR)" as classified in the Minorities at Risk Database (Minorities at Risk Project 2009) is present within a state, it can be assumed that the minority would not be at risk unless the state did not have the capability to use repressive or violent tactics against the minority group. This falls in line with the Minorities at Risk Project (2007:1) definition of a MAR as, "An ethnopolitical group that: collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis other groups in a society; and/or collectively mobilizes in defense or promotion of its self-defined interests." The data provided by the Minorities at Risk Project (2009) has furthermore

been successfully used in the diversionary literature (Tir and Jasinski 2008) as it allows the *direction* of the violence between a state and a minority group to be identified.

In the case of multiple minority groups present in a state, I argue that given the state has the ability to instigate a domestic diversion, this violence can be used against *any* minority group classified as "at risk" within the state. The state's capabilities and characteristics are thus designated the preconditions of diversionary violence, not those of the minority groups on the receiving end of this violence. In other words, for the state to have domestic diversionary tactics in its wheelhouse, it must already have crossed a threshold for repressive or military capabilities.

These instigating state characteristics have preoccupied the existing literature for decades, and perhaps as a consequence of this, these theories have yielded little conclusive, quantitative support for diversionary theories. Tir and Jasinski (2008: 642) admit the quantitative limitations of traditional diversionary war theory were a motivating factor in establishing domestic diversionary theory. The authors (Tir and Jasinski 2008: 656-58) attempt to examine the impact of several variables on the occurrence of domestic diversionary violence, including minority group ethnic ties to neighboring states, minority group size relative to the base population, government military capability, political discrimination, economic development at the state level, the presence of oncoming elections, an armed conflict occurring simultaneously, and others. While they devote some attention to the targeting process, their variable analysis is focused on establishing initial evidence for the presence of this type of conflict and determining its preconditions—they emphasize the state's capabilities and characteristics. However, if all states deploying diversionary tactics must present these characteristics for the tactics to be labeled "diversionary," then in a state system with multiple minority groups present, it is the *minority group's* characteristics that determine its likelihood of being targeted, not the state's capabilities (which would already be present for the diversion to occur). Therefore, this article establishes these variables as the assumptions that are the backbone of DDTS theory.

It is logical that as the first and effectively only published work in the field of domestic diversionary conflict, Tir and Jasinski (2008) would focus on rooting the theory to some extent in the causal mechanisms identified in the traditional diversionary war literature. But the lack of compelling evidence in the diversionary literature has encouraged me to depart from this tradition when constructing DDTS theory. Instead of building variables based on the same mechanisms present in traditional diversionary war theory or domestic diversionary theory, DDTS theory establishes first principles and assumptions about state behavior in a diversionary scenario, then applies these to an analysis of an established instance of domestic diversionary conflict. This permits variables to be operationalized organically from the critical concepts observed in this case study. This will allow for a new visualization of what factors are, from a practical perspective, essential to the diversionary process.

Finally, DDTS theory differs from the existing literature in that it attempts to construct a model for why specific minority groups are chosen as targets for diversionary violence over others. Where Tir and Jasinski's (2008) domestic diversionary theory includes numerous independent variables depicting state behavior and minority group behavior, drawing some secondary conclusions about the concepts that impact targeting, DDTS theory controls for state behavior and conditions, instead measuring minority group behavior and characteristics. This allows for a detailed analysis of the differences between multiple minority groups within one state system, depicting which characteristics correlate with increased likelihood of diversionary targeting. Though the first principles and assumptions of this theory are rooted in the diversionary literature, operationalization of concepts in DDTS theory can only occur after a thorough case study.

Foremost in these assumptions is that state leaders are rational actors. The rationality and inherent self-interest of individuals and states is not only a well-known and essential assumption in the international relations theory of rationalism but also a critical component to the logic of

diversionary war theory. If state leaders are rational, self-interested actors, they can be expected to keep diversionary tactics in their wheelhouse of repressive strategies to maintain their hold on power. Following from this precept, several assumptions about the behavior of states can be made, increasing the predictability of state actions within the diversionary theory. Though the causes for domestic diversionary violence are as varied as the countries pursuing them, ultimately all violence that can be classified as "diversionary" occurs when a state's economy is underperforming, and civil unrest is occurring within the base voter group. These factors, along with the other three described below, are preconditions for diversionary violence occurring *at all*, and are thus assumptions within DDTS theory; [1] rationality of state actors, [2] regime type, [3] military capabilities, [4] economic underperformance, and [5] political unrest are all assumed to be present in this type of conflict.

Rationality of State Actors

An essential tenet of not just DWT but rationalism at large is that state actors are rational and self-interested—they will always, rationally, act in their own self-interest. There is consensus in much of the literature around this idea; Tir and Jasinski (2008: 647) state:

> Moreover, the leader who wants to enhance the chances of his/her political survival cannot select just any ethnic group to serve as the target of a domestic diversionary attack. The selection instead has to be made carefully, as the leader's survival may in part depend on the support from one or more minority groups. The most opportune targets would arguably be the politically and/or economically marginalized groups with a history of antagonism vis-a-vis other groups found within the country. Such groups are referred to by Gurr (2000) as "minorities at risk" (MARs). These groups have relatively little ability to fight back either by intra or extra-constitutional means; moreover, their plight in the face of diversion against them is unlikely to generate sympathy among the other groups, let alone willingness to help them.

Here the authors point out not only that target selection is a conscious decision by the state leader, but also that several constraints impact the selection process. These constraints are taken into account in DDTS based on the logic laid out here, but the important concept behind this

assumption is that target selection is a conscious process, in which state leadership weighs the advantages and disadvantages associated with diversionary tactics against each available target. The state leader, with the purpose of maximizing the political utility from this process, thus logically determines the state's military capabilities, the depth of the economic situation's impact on the leader's popularity, and the capabilities and political utility of various minority populations. This information informs their target selection—the group with limited military capabilities and international support, high levels of political marginalization, historical grievances with the majority population, and which is most efficient (because of geographic concentration or population size) to project militarized violence against. If state leadership are rational political utility maximizers, it can be assumed that they have already determined that diversionary tactics are viable before attempting them. Therefore, it can be assumed that the state has already evaluated its capabilities, and the determinants for diversionary violence are instead to be found in the composition and maneuvers of the targeted minority groups. In determining which minority groups are most at risk of targeting, the diversionary and ethnic conflict literature has frequently (Fox 2000; Gurr 2000; Caprioli and Trumbore 2003) relied on the Minorities at Risk Project (2009) for data and the definition of a MAR.

Regime Type

As discussed in Pickering and Kisangani (2005), almost all regime types are subject to diversionary conflicts. Weeks (2012) argues that authoritarian regimes are influenced by elite groups which hold the economic reigns within a state. Authoritarian regimes engaging in diversionary tactics attempt to increase support from elite groups, whereas democratic diversionary attempts focus on garnering support from the base voter group. Whether a regime is more authoritarian or more democratic, almost all attempt diversionary tactics, though an authoritarian state may have more latitude to use extreme repressive methods against a domestic minority than a democratic regime. Therefore, both authoritarian regimes and democracies will be included in this analysis because both are capable of using diversionary tactics. Determining whether authoritarian diversionary violence is designed to assuage an elite audience as opposed to the base voter group like in a democratic regime is beyond the bounds of the research here, as the determinants of domestic diversionary target selection theory must be determined first. As state leaders are assumed to be rational political utility maximizers, regardless of the audience from which they are attempting to elicit greater support, they will choose the most logical target.

Military Capabilities

States, by definition, hold a monopoly on the use of violence in a country. If a minority group has the military capability to present an existential threat to the state, then the state no longer has a monopoly on violence and the nation in question is a failed state. If a minority group with substantial military capabilities such as the ability to maintain a militia or access to equipment which restricts the state's ability for military response were to be targeted by the state, more widespread conflict than what is ideal for diversionary purposes would result. Conflicts in which minority groups with these capabilities are targeted are therefore not representative of diversionary conflicts; they can decide the fate of the state as a whole and are classified as civil

wars or separatist conflicts. Furthermore, if a conflict were to take place between more evenly matched state military forces and minority group militias, for example the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and Tamil rebels against the Sri Lankan military (Devotta 2005), the likelihood of escalation in the conflict to a full-blown civil war indicates that the minority group would not be "at risk" of *diversionary* targeting by the state. Targeting a minority group with the military capabilities of the Tamils would only happen under the direst of circumstances. For the purposes of this article, any civil war-scale events as identified in the Minorities at Risk Project (2009) and Correlates of War (COW) Dataset (Sarkees and Wayman 2010) are excluded in the final analysis to ensure that only domestic *diversionary* violence is measured. The state leader would thus only target a minority group with sufficiently limited military capabilities to ensure that a wider, existential conflict is not the likely result. Essentially, because state leaders are assumed to be rational actors, the minority at risk of being targeted would not be at risk unless the state has a preponderance of force to use against them.

Although the Minorities at Risk Project (2007) definition of an "at risk" minority assures that each minority involved in the database is discriminated against in some way and is at risk of further persecution, it does not address the issue of state military power relative to the minority group. If a state leader could call on an army of several million for a domestic diversionary attempt against a minority group with a militia of only a few thousand, clearly the state has the military capability to target that minority group. However, if a minority group could field half a million soldiers, the opportunity cost for state leadership may be too high to justify the diversionary attempt. The Minorities at Risk Project (2009) provides data on the total population of the country in which the minority group is found as well as the total population of the minority group in a specific country, but it does not provide information on state or minority group military capabilities. As a result, for the purposes of this article, military capabilities for

the aggressor state and the minority group targeted are approximated based on their total population size.

While it seems intuitive that state military capability relative to the minority would have a major impact on the likelihood of a minority group being targeted for diversionary violence, there is more nuance to the argument than is initially apparent. State military size relative to the minority group does not account for how dispersed or preoccupied the state military is. If state leadership is enduring national economic hardship and nationwide popular unrest, they may be reticent to deploy a large percentage of their forces, which could otherwise be used to repress protests and maintain order in the base population, to engage in a diversionary attack. Furthermore, traditional measures of military capability do not necessarily translate for domestic diversions. When engaging in domestic diversionary violence, the drawback for state leadership is that they target *domestic* assets. Airstrikes are therefore less appealing when roads and other critical infrastructure are the targets, particularly when the state is already facing an economic downturn. In other words, on paper the state may have military capabilities which provide an inaccurate representation of the state's available assets for a domestic diversionary attempt. DDTS theory therefore assumes that for diversionary violence to take place, the state already holds a preponderance of military power relative to the minority.

Economic Volatility and Underperformance

Economic instability or underperformance is a precondition for diversionary violence occurring. There can be many causes for economic instability. The state might be facing economic sanctions which restrict its import/export capabilities or cause unsustainable inflation. If the economy is resource-driven, the threat of a cut to production or a sudden downturn in the export of essential resources could impact revenue streams, as was the case with Russian natural gas exports prior to the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russian natural gas exports flow through

much of Eastern Ukraine and the Crimean Peninsula, which may have precipitated the Russian incursion into Ukrainian territory (Bebler 2015). Furthermore, a state experiencing an economic downturn might target a minority group which has access to resource-rich territory, as the Chinese have cracked down on the minority Uighur population in Xinjiang Province (Blackwill 2016). The state could blame the minority group for causing the economic downturn, perhaps to destabilize the government and gain more autonomy. In democratic states, the popularity of the government is often inextricably linked with economic performance. Tir and Singh (2013) identified a correlation between economic downturns and public opinion about aggressive state foreign policy. If there is an economic downturn, the government will be the first blamed for lost jobs and lowered access to consumer goods. It is intuitive that a state leader facing impending removal due to an economic crisis would target a minority group, diverting popular unrest away from their job performance or policies. DDTS assumes that the state engaging in diversionary violence is already experiencing widespread economic problems.

Political or Civil Unrest

A central feature of diversionary war theory is the presence of popular unrest—this is indeed the mechanism that encourages the state to divert the public's attention in an attempt to allay its loss of popularity. In most if not all diversionary war literature, economic underperformance and civil unrest are considered preconditions for diversionary attempts to occur (Oneal and Tir 2006; Morgan and Bickers 1992; Powell 2014). It is therefore an assumption in this paper that for a diversionary attack to occur, popular protest or other forms of unrest have been occurring. The state leader, facing unrest and unpopularity amongst a critical support group is motivated to build a narrative in which a domestic minority group is the cause of that critical group's troubles, thus diverting their attentions away from the state leader's imminent discomfiture and toward a potentially blameless minority group.

Although these five assumptions will always be present in diversionary violence according to DDTS theory, the individual characteristics of minority groups that make them more attractive targets for diversionary violence are still very much in question. While Tir and Jasinski (2008) analyze a number of variables that could impact a minority group's likelihood of being targeted, the assertion here that all diversionary violence is based exclusively on the characteristics of the minority group opens the door for an analysis of a wider selection of variables which impact a minority group's relationship with the state. However, the novelty of this research requires a point of reference from which to establish which concepts potentially impact the DDTS theory.

III. Case Study: The Kurdish Question: Çiller and Diversionary Violence

Its assumptions and causal logic having been established, it is now prudent to examine a case that is recognized by many scholars as an example of a domestic diversionary conflict to determine the concepts which seem to impact the diversionary model. The dimensions of these concepts can then be operationalized for a quantitative analysis of a large set of cases to determine the relevance of DDTS in the diversionary literature. Tir and Jasinski (2008: 652) point out the evident diversionary component to the Turkish conflict against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and repressive, violent tactics against the Kurdish people in Turkey at large. Contributions to the peace and conflict literature have examined the rationale and domestic popularity requirements of Turkish state leaders in the context of the "Kurdish Question" (Brown 1995; Entessar 2009; Hashimoto and Bezci 2016; Muller 1996; Olson 1996; Nigogosian 1996). The preponderance of research done on this troubled relationship allows a unique opportunity to determine the causal mechanisms present in the conflict from multiple sources, establishing with some authority the diversionary concepts which demand further consideration in the quantitative analysis to come.

Domestic diversionary conflicts are notoriously difficult to study because state leaders as rational political utility maximizers are unlikely to see the benefit in revealing such a cynical motive for warfare and perhaps reduce their popularity further. To deal with this problem, proponents of the diversionary literature index the number of incidents of popular unrest to depict government unpopularity and combine this with measures of domestic economic performance (Tir and Jasinski 2008: 648). This reflects the emphasis that the literature has placed on determining the preconditions for diversionary wars to take place, as well as the focus on quantitative analysis. However, it is also essential to examine the causal chain that leads to a domestic diversionary conflict. The relationship between the Turkish state and its Kurdish ethnic minority reveals how domestic diversionary conflicts develop, while showing the causal linkages between the variables identified to the likelihood of targeting for diversionary violence.

Minorities in the Turkish State

Ethnonationalism in many ways defined the development of the modern Turkish Republic. The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire opened the door for independent states to form around ethnonationalist identity. In the Kemalist Turkish Republic, the population was united around the idea of a national home for the Turkish people. Many of the minority groups present within the boundaries of this new republic identified as very much *not* Turkish. The Caucasian minorities, including the 50,000 Armenian, 75,000 Azeri, 1 million Circassian, 90,000 Georgian, and 150,000 Laz people, have failed to gain any state recognition of their unique cultural and linguistic identities. The Assyrian and Greek Christian minorities have almost completely disappeared from Turkey as a result of Turkification policies since 1924—many Assyrians have joined the western European diaspora, and many Greeks returned to Greece (Karimova and Deverell 2001: 9-16). Around 2 percent (1.6 million people) in Turkey are Arabic-speaking—

most are settled in Hatay Province, on the Syrian border (Karimova and Deverell 2001: 22; Koç 2008: 448).

Upon the fall of the Ottoman Empire and creation of the Turkish Republic, the reconceptualization of Turkish national identity called for a "homeland for the ethnic Turkish and Kurdish peoples." Turkish officials have insisted on referring to Kurds as "mountain Turks," implying that there was little to differentiate them from the Turkish national identity at large (Brown 1995: 117; Gürbey 1996: 13). In 1924, the Treaty of Lausanne removed recognition of cultural, religious, and linguistic minority groups in the Turkish Republic. This Turkification has had a powerful repressive effect on minority rights in Turkey. As Muller (1996: 175) explains, "In one stroke, the Kurdish people lost their right to exist as a recognizable and distinct people and became incorporated into the Turkish nation by virtue of their Muslim heritage."

Minority groups in Turkey represent a substantial portion of the Turkish population. Caucasian minorities comprise an estimated 2 million people in Turkey. The Kurds, with a population between 18 and 20 million, represent at least one-fifth of the total Turkish population (Gunter 2004: 198; CIA World Factbook 2020; Karimova and Deverell 2001: 8-9; Yapp and Dewdney 2020). The Alevis, though they have some crossover between Kurdish, Turkish, and Arab populations in Turkey, represent 15-20 percent of the Turkish state (Karimova and Deverell 2001: 8-9; Yapp and Dewdney 2020). Despite riots and protests against the Turkish state in the mid-1990s by Alevi groups, which resulted in substantial casualties, there have been no substantial military actions taken against their population (Nigogosian 1996: 45). In contrast, the Kurds have experienced decades of coordinated military offensives and crackdowns in the 11 provinces of southeast Turkey. Other proponents of diversionary theory have argued that the population size of the minority group targeted by the state will be relatively small to prevent the chance of reprisals. However, the history of the Turkish-Kurdish relationship appears to contradict this logic, as the Kurds have been consistently targeted by state leadership for decades.

Where other minority groups have faced similar cultural repression to the Kurds, none have been targeted for such wholesale military operations.

Similar characteristics are present to some extent for each minority described above. The Alevis have substantial kinship with groups in neighboring states, such as Syria. The Caucasian minority groups of course also had substantial foreign national support and kinship support due to their proximity. Groups such as the Alevis and Armenians have staged significant protests and riots against the Turkish state. Yet, none of these groups have been targeted to the extent that the Kurds have. A deeper analysis of Turkish-Kurdish relations below will lay out the circumstances that have led to their targeting during a particularly contentious period in Turkish history.

Economic Discrimination and Kinship Groups

Economic discrimination directed toward the Kurds has arguably occurred since before the formation of the Turkish Republic, as regions with heavy Kurdish concentrations in Anatolia and Turkey's southeast—rugged, mountainous, arid regions—have always been scarce on resources and thus unattractive areas for investment. However, this traditional neglect became more pronounced in the wake of the 1980 coup d'état, which specifically targeted left-wing political parties, Turkish, Kurdish, or otherwise. Moving forward the Kurds had little representation in the Turkish political system throughout the 1980s, and thus very few advocates.

Economic growth in the southeast slowed with the absence of political advocacy at the national level, as well as the deliberate repression of Kurdish political and cultural identity through Turkey's legal system in the form of the 1991 "Anti-Terror Act" which, among other things, provided legal backing for the continued enforcement of a militarized police state in the southeast and the destruction of over 2 thousand Kurdish villages (Muller 1996: 182). This exacerbated the already noticeable disparity in the development between Turkish population centers and Kurdish regional bases. Though there were no specific state-level economic policies

designed to favor the majority over Kurdish populations, the systematic elimination of Kurdish villages and the displacement of some 2 million Kurdish civilians were an effective deterrent to economic development (Muller 1996: 182).

Between 1990 and 2006 there were dozens of domestic incidents involving Kurdish protesters and security forces (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). The scale and severity of these protests has varied, but the Kurdish diaspora in Europe has had the interesting effect of allowing for widespread protests against the Turkish state to occur in Turkish embassies, consulates, and businesses worldwide. In Oslo, around thirty ethnic Kurds occupied a Turkish Airlines office to protest Turkish security forces on March 6, 1991. In Paris, a demonstration about the poor treatment of Kurds in Turkey drew several hundred Kurdish demonstrators on August 25, 1992. On March 24, 1993, in several European cities including Marseille, Munich, Copenhagen and others, Kurdish militants took hostages at Turkish consulates (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). Though these events represent a smaller scale of protest and resistance than those occurring within Turkey, they have drawn significant international attention in the past, with news agencies like the BBC and *Agence France Presse* reporting on Kurdish protests (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). The Kurdish minority's size is an asset that other minority groups do not have in such abundance—immigrant populations in Western Europe and North America can utilize civic action channels to push governments to encourage reform of Turkish policies. Though it is outside the bounds of this paper to quantify the impact that international protests have on domestic policy reform within Turkey, it is plausible that they helped shape the narrative outside Turkey about the Kurdish plight and drew public attention in the United States and Europe to the Turkish security forces' treatment of Kurds (Brown 1995: 124).

Kindred groups that share a border with Turkey also have a significant impact on its Kurdish policy. In response to growing Kurdish strength across the border in Iraq after the Persian Gulf War, the Özal administration attempted a ceasefire with the PKK in order to allow

for the celebration of Newroz and a lifting of the Kurdish language ban. Though the Çiller administration walked back many of the reforms of the Özal era, increased Kurdish strength in Iraq undoubtedly had an impact on Turkish relations with its own Kurdish population. Thus, kindred group support, non-state foreign support, and foreign state support are all important factors in the Turkish state-Kurdish minority relationship.

Turkish-Kurdish Relations from 1923-1992

The 1924 Treaty of Lausanne was followed by a series of Kurdish uprisings between 1925-1938. The Turkish military, keenly aware that the steady secession of minority groups from the Ottoman Empire acted as a catalyst to its downfall, brutally quashed these Kurdish revolts, denying the revolutionaries their goal of an independent state. No organized Kurdish resistance of note took place until the 1970s.

In 1978, in the Kurdish village of Fis, Abdullah "Apo" Ocalan and a group of like-minded Marxist-Leninist Kurdish nationalists established the *Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane*, also known as the "Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK)." The group sought to build support for an independent Kurdish republic in southeastern Turkey, but their efforts often led to casualties as civilians found themselves in the crosshairs. Through "Viet Cong-style terror tactics," (Brown 1995: 118) the PKK used fear and violence to garner support, voluntary or otherwise, from the surrounding areas. By the early 1980s, 15,000 militants were estimated to be active within the PKK. In August 1984, PKK "Kurdistan Freedom Brigades" attacked strategic locations throughout the Kurdish regions, including the cities Erduh and Sundinli (Brown 1995: 118). These attacks were meant to demonstrate PKK resolve to Turkish forces and encourage the Turkish government to rescind bans on the use of Kurdish language and the practice of Kurdish cultural traditions, including the celebration of Newroz, the Kurdish New Year. Indirectly, this offensive was meant to increase Kurdish support for their own independent state. The 1984

offensive was just the precursor to a seven-year period of attacks that were part of the PKK strategy of "revolutionary violence," in which Turkish military and government forces, dissenting Kurds and others were targeted to further PKK goals (Gürbey 1996: 23).

The impact of the PKK on the Kurdish population of Turkey at large is difficult to overstate. Though he faced a state investigation for its publication, Doğu Ergil's article *The Southeast Report* outlined the sentiment and allegiance of Kurds from many regional bases, including Diyarbakir, Batman, Mardin, Adana, Mersin, and Antalya and indicates how widespread anti-Turkish sentiment had become over the eleven years since the violence of 1984. Ergil's findings suggested that amongst the sample of Kurdish individuals interviewed, 35 percent were close to someone in the PKK and 77 percent thought the Turkish military could not defeat them. On the question of whether the respondent supported PKK actions, 65 percent chose not to answer, but 47 percent of those who did respond supported PKK actions. 88 percent of respondents wished to see structural changes to the political system in Turkey (Nigogosian 1996: 45)." These numbers underscore how inextricable the PKK were from the Kurdish population at large and how any large-scale operation against the Kurds would necessarily be catastrophic to the Kurdish civilian population as well. Any diversionary elements present in the Turkish offensives against the PKK therefore also target the Kurdish minority group as a whole.

The '80s were marked by the anti-Kurdish policies of Turkey's Motherland Party, with party founder Turgut Özal as prime minister from 1983-1987, Ali Bozer for 10 days in 1989, Yildirim Akbulut from 1989-1991, under the presidency of Kenan Evren followed by the ascension of Turgut Özal. Repression of human rights in Kurdish districts and forward deployment of an impressive 260,000 Turkish troops in Kurdish territory underscored the Turkish leadership's disinterest in negotiation during this period. Though PKK tactics to force Kurdish civilian support for the movement may have been inhumane, Turkish efforts to curb this support were often brutal and oppressive, with an estimated 200,000 deaths since 1985

(Nigogosian 1996: 44) and over 2,000,000 civilians displaced since the beginning of the first insurgency in 1984 (Muller 1996: 182). Beyond the staggering figures, Turkish state tactics used to limit support for these policies included limiting freedom of speech and expression, indefinite detention of journalists and activists, and torture (Nigogosian 1996: 45; Muller 1996: 182).

The Özal Era

The early '90s were a period of marked change in Turkish policy toward the Kurds, challenging the doleful Kurdish proverb that states, "The Kurds have no friends but the mountains (Hashimoto and Bezci 2016: 640)." The administration change from the neoliberal Motherland Party in favor of the social conservative True Path Party (predecessor of Erdogan's current AKP), concurrent with the geopolitical upheaval of the Persian Gulf War led to a change in policy toward the Kurds. The ousting of the Iraqi army from Kuwait and Saddam Hussein's consequent weakened influence in the region meant the potential for the Iraqi Kurds to achieve, at the very least, a greater level of autonomy in northern Iraq. True Path Party leadership saw an opportunity to appeal to this faction by resolving the conflict with its own Kurdish population, lessening the chance that Turkish Kurds would attempt to form a geographically and culturally unified system with their cross-border cousins. As Brown (1996: 120) explains, "If Turkey could successfully move to settle its own Kurdish problem, then the Iraqi Kurds might begin to see Turkey as a protector instead of an enemy." Turkish state leadership began to make moves toward reconciliation, with Özal announcing an end to the ban of Kurdish music in February 1991. However, any goodwill generated from this reform was effectively squandered when Kurds from the Iraqi Kurdistan region, in an effort to improve relations with Turkey, agreed to prevent PKK forces in Iraq from using their territory to launch insurgent attacks into Turkey (Olson 1992). The PKK responded by cutting supply lines from Turkey to Northern Iraq, leading to a joint Peshmerga-Turkish military offensive in October 1992 against PKK positions in

Northern Iraq. Casualty reports from this conflict are contentious, but PKK strength across the region was damaged to some extent as a result (Gunter 1996: 55; *BBC News* 2007).

In 1993, Öcalan declared a "unilateral and unconditional ceasefire (Entessar 2009: 142)." Years of airstrikes and commando raids by Turkish security forces throughout the 1980s and early '90s had weakened the PKK (Olson 1992: 489-92). In 1992, hostilities between the PKK and Masoud Barzani's Iraqi "Kurdistan Democratic Party" (KDP) had further weakened the PKK. Finally, Öcalan may have seen the ceasefire as an opportunity to consolidate power in the midst of infighting between the KDP and Jalal Talabani's Iraqi "Patriotic Union of Kurdistan" (PUK), particularly in the wake of Operation Northern Iraq (Gunter 1996: 50-5). Whatever the cause, 1993 proved a pivotal year in the resolution of the "Kurdish Question." This change of tactics for the PKK embodied the growing ownership of ethnonationalist identity within the Turkey's Kurdish community and a more unified approach to achieving the goals of the Kurdish people at large. Öcalan's statements were met by President Özal's announcement that pro-Kurdish reforms could begin, but the Turkish government carried on with military operations against the PKK despite the ceasefire. Özal's death in April 1993 was followed by a renewal of PKK violence in May 1993 with a PKK assault that killed 33 Turkish conscripts as a response to the government's failure to comply to the ceasefire (Brown 1995: 122).

The Çiller Administration

The death of Özal and the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War marked another change in Turkish policy regarding the "Kurdish Question." In 1993, Tansu Çiller, first female prime minister of Turkey, took control of government. As leader of the "True Path Party" (*Doğru Yol Partisi,* DYP*),* a neoliberal, socially conservative organization, Çiller's policies initially had a heavy focus on economic reforms. However, these neoliberal economic policies were confounded by a capital and equity redistribution scheme rendered necessary by the coalition

formed by the DYP and the social democrat SHP Party. Having spent many years in the United States attaining a Ph.D. from the University of Connecticut, American politics and norms had an influence on Çiller's policy making. As Sakallıoğlu (2002: 200) explains,

> The third major influence on the formation of Çiller's essential qualities was her favorable view of American society and economy. When she first emerged on the political stage in Turkey, there were speculations that her pro-Americanism helped her win the sympathy and support of the U.S. government."

Perhaps because of this American connection, Çiller was initially disposed to uphold the Özal imperative, bringing the PKK to the negotiation table, particularly given the context of the Persian Gulf War and the new strategic interest in maintaining good relations with Turkey's Kurdish neighbors in northern Iraq. As the economic situation degraded into a full-blown recession in Turkey and facing popular unrest in non-Kurdish regions, Çiller conceded to the ongoing pressures of the military and conservatives within her own party, widening the conflict against the PKK (Brown 1995: 123; Sakallıoğlu 2002: 203).

The increased Turkish military presence in Kurdish territory and offensives against the PKK during the Çiller era generated a rally around the flag effect for her administration and put the PKK on the back foot, though continued economic pressures ensured this was short lived. As Brown (1995: 123) explains, "…Turkish nationalist sentiment began to rise as the conflict in the southeast became even bloodier." Writing in 1995, Nigogosian (44) pointed out, "The array of forces rallying around Prime Minister Çiller for the forthcoming elections will most likely press with even more vigor to eradicate the Kurdish nationalist movement led by the PKK." Though Çiller did not achieve reelection, there is an identifiable trend toward increased nationalism and nativism as a result of Çiller's widening of the conflict against the Kurds from 1993 onwards, as seen in the prosecution of seven members of Turkish Parliament who had made supposed pro-PKK comments. Though members of Turkish Parliament (MPs) were traditionally immune from prosecution, this immunity was lifted in early March 1994, and all seven MPs received prison

sentences between three and fifteen years (Brown 1995: 123-4). This imprisonment and the alleged crimes against humanity perpetrated by Turkish security forces during this period caused substantial international outcry and even pushed the United States to impose conditions on 10% of its military aid to Turkey and Germany to completely revoke its aid, though this decision was later reversed (Brown 1995: 124). This international consensus went against the desires of a hefty contingent of the Turkish population, which wished for continued conflict against the PKK, with which it considered itself to be in "all-out war (Brown 1995: 125)." The Turkish offensive against the Kurds was enormously expensive and acted as a drag on the Turkish economy. In 1995 alone, approximately $8 billion was spent fighting the conflict, around 20 percent of the national budget (Brown 1995: 123; Nigogosian 1996: 44; Sakallıoğlu 2002: 202). Compounded by perhaps the direst economic situation the Turkish Republic had experienced since the coup d'état and institution of martial law in 1980, Çiller faced the unenviable position of choosing between improving the economy and international relations with essential allies or increasing domestic popularity with her voter base and the military elite through continued conflict against the embattled PKK. Despite Öcalan's evident desire to come to the negotiation table and reach a ceasefire agreement, the Çiller administration continued to persecute the war against the PKK and accrue substantial Kurdish civilian casualties as an inevitable result. In this case, economic and social pressures led to the state leadership's decision to expand and pursue conflict against a minority group which had neither the strength nor support to represent an existential threat to the state. The result of this conflict was increased popularity, a rally around the flag effect for the Çiller administration.

The Kurdish Question in Turkey overflowed into other critical dyads of the Çiller foreign policy era. As the conflict escalated in 1995, two former Turkish MPs of Kurdish heritage approached Russian Federation government officials in an attempt to establish a Kurdish

Parliament in Exile (KPE). Turkish officials put a quick end to this only a week later by meeting in Moscow with Russian officials to sign the "Protocol to Prevent Terrorism," which among other resolutions refused to recognize the PKK as a legitimate institution. This tacit agreement to not support any pro-Kurdish institution within Russia expanded over the next month into a wider pragmatic agreement between the two states, as Russia's agreement to not support any Kurdish nationalist movement within its borders was met by Turkish support for the ongoing war in Chechnya and eventually an acquiescence to increased Russian economic influence over the Caucasus (Olson 1996: 96-7). After all, Boris Yeltsin was in the midst of a bloody conflict against a minority group of his own at the time. This immediate Turkish response to the informal Kurdish visit to Moscow shows that although international political response to the Turkish offensives against Kurds was not enough to halt the conflict, an established kinship group with political power and the ear of a perhaps pliable foreign government was threat enough to warrant a direct response and countermeasure on the part of the Turkish government.

The Çiller administration arguably squandered any rally around the flag effect that resulted from the widening of the conflict with the PKK—the conflict was something of a self-fulfilling prophecy as it deepened the Turkish economic crisis even further, thus making a wash of any popularity the Çiller administration may have gained. However, the outcome of a diversionary conflict does not determine its existence. Historical grievances in the form of a bloody and ongoing conflict with an ethnic minority added to the brutality of the conflict and perhaps increased nationalist sentiment amongst Çiller's base. The severity of this and high frequency violent incidents undoubtedly played a role in the further escalation of the conflict. The geographic location of Kurdish population centers, as well as the PKK presence in Iraqi Kurdistan pushed the Turkish government to widen the conflict, even performing an incursion into Iraqi territory in 1991, risking the expansion of the conflict into a MID. The possibility of

expanded political or perhaps even military power for the Kurds via a kinship group in Russia was enough threat to the Turkish government for them to expend valuable political capital to intervene directly. Perhaps the most interesting observation from this analysis is how the PKK's connections to Peshmerga forces and other Kurdish groups in northern Iraq affected the administration's response to PKK actions. After Saddam Hussein's defeat in the Gulf War and the strengthening of Iraqi Kurdistan's autonomy, the Özal administration attempted a cessation of hostilities to prevent the secession of its Kurdish territories. The Çiller administration, however, reversed this policy, cracking down on Kurdish regions and expanding the conflict despite international disapproval. While many factors undoubtedly played a role in this policy shift, the continued economic downturn and precarious political situation amongst the base population seem to have influenced the Çiller administration's evaluation of the Kurds' political utility.

IV. Research Design and Analysis

The case of the "Kurdish Question" yields several concepts that seem to have an impact on the targeting process. There is no doubt that smoking-gun level evidence that states pursue domestic diversionary violence is impossible to collect because state leaders are rational actors and logically would not benefit from admitting such a tactic, but a quantitative analysis of hundreds of cases of intrastate violence involving state forces and minority populations should shed light on the frequency of these occurrences and establish a correlation between violence and increased popularity for state leadership. It can also help definitively differentiate between which variables are unique to the Kurdish case, and which are universal in the diversionary process.

This analysis will help gauge whether these identified concepts also contribute to the diversionary targeting framework. I synthesize these identified concepts into distinct variables which capture their essential dimensions. My research utilizes the Minorities at Risk (2009) database to establish quantitative backing for a set of seven variables that have not yet been assessed in the domestic diversionary literature. These variables are [1] history of grievances: the frequency and severity of past violent incidents between the state and a domestic minority group, [2] the geographic concentration of the minority group, [3] the level of economic discrimination faced by the minority group, [4] the protest level of a minority group prior to conflict outbreak, [5] international governmental support level for the minority group, [6] non-state actor international support level and [7] level of kindred group support.

Building the Dependent Variable and Controls

Traditional diversionary war theory has always sought to link domestic conditions to the outbreak of MIDs. Domestic diversionary research has followed a similar path, as domestic conditions are linked to violence against domestic minority groups. This article attempts a

similar goal, identifying the impact of a set of conditions on the likelihood of domestic diversionary targeting. Thus, the dependent variable is the same: the presence or absence of a diversionary conflict in any given observation. This dependent variable was thus constructed primarily from three sources: World Bank's "GDP Growth (Annual %) Data (2019)," the Minorities at Risk Project (2009) Database, and the Cline Center for Advanced Social Research's "Social, Political, and Economic Event Database (SPEED)" Civil Unrest Database (Nardulli et al. 2015).

As minority group population size, military capabilities, economic underperformance, and the presence of popular unrest are all assumed to be necessary for a diversionary attempt to occur, these variables are operationalized as controls. An index of economic and civil conditions is designed which incorporates each country in the MAR Database in order to control for these conditions. Economic conditions are confirmed through Word Bank data measuring annual percentage GDP change (GDP Growth Annual % Data 2019). Civil unrest conditions were determined using the Cline Center's SPEED Dataset, which unfortunately only provides data for the years 1945-2005 (Nardulli et al. 2015). Since the MAR Database provides data on the requisite variables only for the years 2004-2005, this article's dataset was limited to observations from the year 2005, with data for the "recent grievances" variable coming from MAR data from 2004. The "recent grievances" variable draws partially on observations of repressive tactics used against the minority group in the year preceding. Therefore, MAR data from 2004 could not be used to increase the temporal range of the study because there is no MAR data available from the year 2003 with which to build the "recent grievances" variable for the year 2004. The SPEED Civil Unrest data were corroborated with qualitative explanations of state-level and regional tensions from Human Rights Watch (HRW) Reports by Country and Region (2020) reports by country and region. An assessment of military capabilities relative to the minority group is established in the form of an index, with the assumption that state military capabilities must

greatly outmatch those of the minority at risk group. This control variable is aided by the fact that for the minority group in the MAR Database to be considered "at risk," they must lack substantial military capabilities to rival those of the state. Finally, to control for minority group population size, every minority with a population of less than 100,000 within a state is excluded from the dataset, as the population must be substantial enough for a diversionary attempt to attract popular attention. The MAR Database already filters for this population control, ensuring that each group included in my analysis is already considered to be of substantial size. This variable is not without its deficiencies, for example, if the minority group only reaches 100,000 people and resides in China, with a population of approximately 1.4 billion, then the group may not have a substantial population relative to the base population. However, most countries included in the dataset represent far lower populations than the most populous country on earth, and their minority populations therefore are relatively more substantial. In the case of China, it is the exception that proves the rule.

Building the Dataset and its Temporal Limitations

Following the trail of Tir and Jasinski (2008), a dataset of individual minority groups at risk within a country was established by utilizing the available data from the Minorities at Risk Project (2009) Database. This data provides observations from multiple minority groups at risk within a single country, if there are any present. This yielded a set of 284 total observations—but this is where my data collection departs from previous literature. Because the diversionary literature emphasizes that political unrest and economic underperformance/volatility should be occurring at the time that the conflict takes place, these conditions had to be accounted for in the data.

Data on economic underperformance was taken from World Bank (GDP Growth Annual % Data 2019). Where possible, multiple data points for each country were used to confirm

economic underperformance. Measurements for overall unemployment levels and GDP growth were both used as indicators of economic performance, because GDP alone might not accurately depict quality of life for a state's citizens. However, unemployment measurements were not available through World Bank (Unemployment Annual % Data 2019) for all the states in the dataset, at which point GDP measurements were used instead (GDP Growth Annual % Data 2019). If the observed state had either seen a reduction in GDP growth from the previous year or an increase in unemployment level over the previous year, it was coded as underperforming economically. Using two measurements ensured a higher level of certainty about the economic situation in each observed country. Some specific countries in the MAR Database were excluded at this point, as, for example, Taiwan is not included in World Bank data as an independent state. This yielded a total set of 117 countries from which targeting attempts against multiple domestic minority groups could be analyzed. World Bank measurements on economic underperformance were then combined with the Cline Center SPEED data on civil unrest to provide a complete list of states included in the MAR Database which met the preconditions for diversionary conflict to occur.

Once this variable for diversionary preconditions had been created, it was possible to winnow it further by identifying the states in which violence targeting the minority group had occurred in 2005. The MAR Project (2009) Database details the type of repressive tactic used by the state against a minority group. With this data in hand, only cases in which *violent* tactics were used against the minority group were coded. Repressive tactics that fell short of violence were excluded from the cases of domestic diversionary conflict. Thus, 284 total minority groups in 117 countries within the MAR Project (2009) Database formed a comprehensive set of cases for the year 2005.

Operationalizing the Independent Variables

Tir and Jasinski's (2008) work on domestic diversionary conflicts focused on analyzing the impact of some crucial variables in state-minority group relations, including the size of the minority population, how much political discrimination it faces, and others. However, the case study on the Kurdish Question identified several variables which could impact the targeting process and have not yet been addressed in the literature. It is the goal of this article to design a model which encompasses the essential dimensions of these variables and evaluates their overall impact on the dependent variable. This will help identify which variables have universal impact, and which are special to the Kurdish case in Turkey. The causal logic of this theory allows for four independent variables to be analyzed against three constants, described below:

1. Recent Grievances

Other contributions to the literature have correlated the presence of ongoing conflict in a state to the likelihood of a diversionary attack against a minority group (Tir and Jasinski 2008: 652). However, the level of violence or repression levied against a minority group *prior* to a domestic diversionary attack occurring has not yet been considered. If a minority group has already been targeted recently by the state, the political cost for achieving a rally around the flag effect (the ultimate aim of the diversionary process) is much lower for state leadership because there is no need to construct a narrative from scratch as to why the voter base should support the state's aggression. As rational political utility maximizers, state leadership would assumedly target the group whose threat to national security has already been established in the state's narrative. Because of the substantial utility potential for the state in the presence of recent grievances, it is expected that this variable will have the highest impact in the model. To capture this dimension, I build an index of violent or repressive incidents targeting a specific minority group by utilizing the quantitative data provided by the MAR Project (2009) Database in the

"overnment repression of group" variable. The type of violence indicated by this variable is coded to form a comprehensive index of minority interactions and conflict outbreak. The presence or absence of state repression of the minority group in the year preceding the observed diversionary violence is operationalized as a scale of [0, 1, 2], with [0] representing no recent grievance, [1] representing repressive tactics that fall short of outright violence, and [2] depicting a violent tactic utilized by the state against the minority group in the preceding year. This indexing of repressive tactics is a strength of this variable, as it accounts for the multitude of government repressive tactics used against minority groups, while simultaneously integrating them into a manageable scale. It is expected that if more violent tactics are used by the state, the level of grievance will be higher. Thus, cases in which *violent* repressive tactics were used in the recent past will be most likely to correlate to diversionary violence in 2005.

There are shortfalls to this operationalization. First, this research is hindered by its temporal range; with only data from 2004 and 2005 available for this analysis, wider patterns of diversionary violence are difficult to observe. This variable could undoubtedly be more precisely captured in the future as recent data on conflicts from 2007 onward are added to the MAR Project Database and others. But given the constraints placed on data collection for this article at the time of writing, this variable provides the best available measurement of this dimension. Second, there is the issue of bleedover of violence from the previous year. If violent tactics are used against a minority group in the previous year and in 2005, the observation in question could potentially be a continuation of that same violence and thus subject to domestic conditions prior to 2004 and therefore not observed in the measurements for this variable. I argue that this is in fact a strength of this study. Whether the conflict observed in 2005 is a picking-up, continuation, or escalation of diversionary tactics begun previously, state leadership clearly sees some benefit in persisting. As diversionary violence is only coded in this dataset if civil unrest or economic underperformance is occurring in the observed state, the continuation of diversionary attempts in

the face of this statewide turmoil speaks to the utility of this tactic. A resumption of hostilities further suggests the utility of diversionary tactics—their repetitive use indicates that state leadership is not just experimenting with increasing popularity at home but trusts the impact of these tactics. Therefore, the explanatory power of this variable and its importance to the theory necessitates its inclusion. Despite the evident drawbacks of its operationalization, it is the only construction which captures the necessary dimensions of this variable.

2. Geographic Concentration of Minority Group

Although state military power is more easily projected within the confines of the state's own borders, it is still a finite resource. If multiple minority groups are present within a country, all other factors being equal, the state would likely choose to target a minority group whose population mostly resides in a "regional base," described by the MAR Project (2007: 8) as, "…a spatially contiguous region larger than an urban area that is part of the country, in which 24% or more of the minority resides and in which the minority constitutes the predominant proportion of the population." A minority's regional base is not only a more attractive state target because of its centralized location, but also because there is a smaller proportion of the base population present in this location. This means that the diversionary attempt potentially has less chance of causing blowback from collateral casualties in the base population. This perhaps also increases the state leadership's willingness to engage in a more violent or less restricted conflict. Therefore, it is predicted that the presence of a regional base for a minority group will increase its chances of being targeted by the state for a diversionary attack.

Several other dimensions to this variable could impact the likelihood of a minority group being targeted. The proximity of a regional base to a bordering state, particularly one in which a substantial population of minority kindship groups reside, could act as a deterrent to diversionary attempts, as the state leadership fears internationalizing the violence. However, this ethnic

kinship dimension is addressed in another variable and will thus not be included here to prevent covariance in the model. It could also be assumed that geographic obstructions between state forces and the minority group's regional base, such as mountains and rivers, form natural lines of defense that could limit any enhancements to state military projection capabilities stemming from the minority group's geographic concentration. However, most modern state militaries have access to airpower that reduces the defensive impact of mountainous terrain and as the state is operating within its own borders, it is unlikely to deal with problems like blown bridges and roads that become major hindrances in MIDs (at least until in close proximity to a minority group's regional base). Because even the most poverty-stricken governments have access to rudimentary air support and they are operating within their own borders, geographic and topographic features are unlikely to have an impact on the success of a diversionary attempt. Thus, the necessary dimension to operationalize in this concept is the overall geographic concentration of the minority group.

To capture this dimension, this article relies on data on minority bases already collected through the MAR Project Database. Geographic concentration is enumerated in the MAR Database as several variables, some of which factor in the presence or absence of a minority regional base, and the population concentration of the minority group within that base. By focusing on this regional base concept, these measurements are more restrictive than necessary for this article's purposes. If a minority population is widely dispersed, it is expected to be harder to target than if the group is highly concentrated in a region, not exclusively one city and its surrounding areas. Therefore, geographic concentration is determined without the inclusion of minority base presence and composition. This article's geographic concentration variable is operationalized as a scale from [0, 1, 2, 3], with [0] indicating a widely dispersed minority group population, [1] indicating a primarily urban located minority population or that they are a minority in one region and dispersed in others, [2] expresses that the minority group is the

majority in one region, and dispersed throughout other regions, while [3] depicts that the minority group is concentrated in one region. These measurements explain how the level of minority group geographic concentration impacts its likelihood of being targeted in a permissive fashion, accounting for the dimension of higher concentration of population, as well as the presence or absence of a majority of the minority group in a specific region of the country being observed. This variable thus includes the necessary dimensions to grasp the heart of this concept while only leaving behind the dimensions that are considered unnecessary for explanatory purposes as described above. It is expected that the higher the number on this scale that a minority group receives, the more likely they are of being targeted for diversionary purposes because they are more centrally located and there is less chance of collateral damage amongst the base population of non-minority citizens. Thus, geographic concentration of the minority group is expected to have a direct, positive relationship with the independent variable.

There are some downsides to operationalizing in this fashion. While group concentration is the primary concern and is included as a dimension, dimensions like military projection capabilities and size of the minority region relative to the overall size of the state are left behind. If the state is so large as to make power projection capabilities difficult in areas far from military bases of operations, the cost of carrying out a diversionary attack may simply be too high, even if the minority group is highly concentrated in a region. However, there are few states large enough for this to become an issue, and the largest states (e.g. Russian Federation, People's Republic of China) have highly developed militaries that are more than capable of projecting power within their own territory.

Indeed, the very definition of sovereignty implies the ability of the state to enforce its laws and defend its citizens, i.e. A monopoly on violence. Should the state be unable to project power *within* its own country, it is doubtful that it has a monopoly on violence and may therefore be evidence of a failed state. In a conflict where a non-state entity perpetrates enough of the

violence represent an existential threat to state leadership, the conflict is indicative of a civil war or revolution and is therefore not diversionary in nature. If state leadership is fighting a domestic conflict in which its very existence is in jeopardy, it likely has larger concerns than public unrest or a faltering economy. By excluding failed states from this article's dataset, this issue has been nullified. For the purposes of exclusion, a failed state was defined as any state undergoing an intrastate war not fully in its own power to suppress. As the Minorities at Risk Project (2009) contains a cross-identification code for each observation to the Correlates of War Database (COW) (Sarkees and Wayman 2010), the type of war ongoing at the time of the MAR Project observation could be identified, and any failed states thus excluded from the final dataset.

A further argument against this operationalization of minority group concentration is the issue of utility from the diversionary attack—if the minority group is settled far away from the base population, then attacking the group is unlikely to yield a rally around the flag effect because the base population is unconcerned with events happening on the front lines, far away from their population centers. However, in the event of a diversionary attack, it can be easily assumed that the state will push as much media attention as possible on the ongoing violence to encourage a surge in nationalism. With the ubiquity of internet, radio, and television news in every region of the globe in this article's sample year of 2005, ensuring that the diversionary conflict is a headline in domestic affairs should be easily achievable by every country in the dataset.

3. Economic Discrimination against the Minority Group

The state may use many types of discrimination to limit the prosperity of its minority groups. Though the impact of political and cultural marginalization on the targeting process has been observed in the literature, there is little discussion of the impact of economic discrimination, possibly because of the difficulty in controlling for the many intervening

variables that might affect this dimension. First, it is unlikely that a state's natural resources should be evenly distributed amongst its minority groups. Indeed, the argument could be made the minority is marginalized to begin with due to its inability to capitalize on resources that were available to other state actors during the development of the state. Second, control of natural resources may mean that what is seen as economic discrimination is actually an attempt at an equitable distribution of limited state assets. For example, the Kurds in Northern Iraq benefit greatly from their control of oil resources in the region. As a result, their flourishing economy is not necessarily critically hindered by receiving less state-level investment in its industries from Baghdad. What on paper may qualify as economic discrimination, in reality becomes less convincing.

For this article's purposes, I argue that these intervening variables do not necessarily warrant the exclusion of this dimension of the diversionary process. An exploration of the minorities included in the MAR Project (2009) Database reveals that in some extraordinary cases like Iraqi Kurdistan, some minorities have access to resources that others in the country do not, but these groups are unlikely to be included in the MAR Project Database, and even if they were, would only serve as the very few exceptions that prove the rule. Furthermore, Iraqi Kurdistan's unique relationship with its government comes as a result of direct foreign intervention in Iraq due to the use of chemical weapons on Kurdish civilians in the region and Saddam Hussein's defeat in the Gulf War, making it a well-known and fairly unique case of high-level foreign government military support. Because at-risk minorities so rarely have access to economic advantages that other groups in the state system do not, these few cases are unlikely to variable's performance in the final model.

As economic instability and underperformance define the domestic environment in which diversionary violence takes place, the impact of economic discrimination specifically cannot be overlooked. Other forms of discrimination have been analyzed by the literature and found to be

insignificant to domestic diversionary violence and can therefore be put aside for the purposes of this article. But in a situation where an economy is faltering, a logical step taken by the state may be to limit economic benefits for the minority group, favoring the base population. From a causal perspective, this strategy does two things, [1] it pushes more capital and resources to the base population, who largely decide whether the state leadership stays in power and [2] can be a component of a state-driven narrative that the minority group is responsible for the country's current economic woes. This helps to shift blame away from state leadership at the same time that diversionary violence takes place, having an additive effect on the diversionary attempt. It is therefore expected that economic discrimination will have a direct, positive impact on the independent variable.

The MAR Project Database contains data for economic discrimination, indexed to indicate different levels of economic discrimination levied against a minority group by the state: [0] no discrimination, [1] basic neglect by the state but some remedial policies, [2] neglect with no remedial policies, [3] social exclusion or a neutral policy, and [4] active repressive policies that restrict a minority group's economic activities (Minorities at Risk Project 2007: 11). I utilize this index for this article, as its level of nuance into the different types of economic discrimination should show the variable's correlation or lack thereof to the likelihood of diversionary violence occurring. Because of the strong causal link between economic discrimination and diversionary tactics explained in this theory, economic discrimination is expected to have a substantial impact on the model, close to that of geographic concentration but perhaps not as high as recent grievances.

4. Protest Level of the Minority Group

Unlike the "recent grievances" variable which attempts to capture the dimension of government repression on likelihood of diversionary conflict, the spirit of the "protest level"

variable is to quantify whether the level of protest amongst a minority group has an impact on its likelihood of being targeted by the state. The causal logic is straightforward: diversionary war literature dictates that economic underperformance is a precursor to this type of conflict occurring. Economic underperformance means fewer resources, fewer jobs, and fewer friends in intrastate relations. Competing over these resources becomes more heated in the event of a recession or otherwise catastrophic economic event, and a marginalized minority group is likely to protests as a result. Ensuing pushback against state policies is likely to spur resentment amongst the base population, and act as a catalyst for further repression and state-sanctioned violence against the minority. Therefore, the higher the protest level of the minority group, the more likely that they will be targeted for diversionary purposes. State repression of protesting minority groups is designed to dampen protests for multiple reasons; [1] it shuts down protests before they can cause significant economic damage to an already injured economy, and [2] the show of force can act as a deterrent factor for protests among society outside the minority group.

The essential dimension to depict in this variable is the level of protest amongst the minority group. The MAR Project Database provides measurements for level of minority protest in an index from [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. These values indicate different protest activities rated as low to high severity, with [0] indicating none reported, [1] verbal resistance in the form of calls for independence, [2] symbolic protest such as sabotage, destruction of property, and organized political actions, [3] small protests and demonstrations involving fewer than 10,000 people, [4] medium-size protests involving between 10,000 and 100,000 participants, and [5] large protests involving over 100,000 people (Minorities at Risk Project 2007: 22).

This variable adequately operationalizes the level of protest for the purposes of this article, but that does not mean that it encompasses every dimension of this concept or that it does not have its drawbacks. While the level of ongoing protest in the context of independence movements and anti-government protest is depicted, there is an issue of scale—significant

protest could occur in a minority group with fewer than 100,000 people but not be reported as a level [4] event because of the minority's size. In countries with total populations of only 3 or 4 million, this could become a reporting issue, since a protest involving 50,000 people in a country this size would still be relatively important. However, this problem is partially remedied by the fact that only minorities with at least 100,000 members or greater than 1 percent of the total population are included in the MAR Project Database. Protest level therefore should still be adequately measured despite this drawback.

Also, this variable leaves behind the dimension of protest level in other minority groups. There is a lot of nuance to be teased from the concept of interplay between protesting minority groups, for example, in a country with multiple minority groups, protests in one group could inspire other groups to join the same cause. This could be a threat to state stability. However, this article codes the protest level for individual minority groups within a country for the same year, so if protests are taking place in multiple minority groups, this dimension should still be present in the final model by determining which protesting groups were targeted for diversionary attempts. Furthermore, this variable excludes any data about *which* segments of the minority group are protesting. It would be interesting to know whether protesting political elites in a MAR group or working-class individuals have a greater impact on the likelihood of a diversionary attempt taking place. However, that dimension is outside the parameters of this research and therefore not necessary to represent in the final model.

Despite the dimensions left behind in this variable, "protest level" is expected to have a direct, positive impact on the model. As the level of protest increases, there will be increased urgency in state leadership to shut it down to prevent further economic disruption and maintain stability. If these protests continue, a show of force against the minority group in the form of diversionary violence would be an appealing option for state leadership as a warning to other groups interested in engaging in protest or other disruptive activities.

5. International Non-State Support Level

Many minority groups receive international support from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like Red Cross or Amnesty International in the form of discrete resources, political action and even, in the case of terror groups like Boko Haram, military support. This international support can implicitly signal to state leaders that targeting this minority group could lead to international consequences, thus making the group a less desirable target. Tir and Jasinski (2008) contend that this effect is so strong as to completely exclude any groups with substantial international support from their dataset. However, in a case of economic underperformance, in which state leadership is losing popularity in its base, international support may take a backseat to quieting domestic unrest. There may even be cases in which ignoring or flagrantly disobeying international insistence on state behavior is a benefit to state leadership. For example, Vladimir Putin's 1999 war in Chechnya only strengthened his domestic approval rating, despite widespread international concern regarding violation of human rights and threats of sanctions against the Russian Federation. I therefore argue that this dimension may play a role in the diversionary targeting process, and minority groups with substantial international support should be analyzed to see whether this support acts as a deterrent against domestic diversionary targeting.

Non-state support is measured in the MAR database by three separate variables, [1] political support, [2] military support, and [3] material support. Political support is expected to have the least utility to the minority group—they are a foreign actor below the state level and therefore their political support would be limited and likely easily ignored by the minority's state government. Non-state political support may include advocacy groups which can appeal the plight of the minority group at an international stage like the United Nations (UN), but not every group is capable of drawing such specific attention from support groups, and even if they do receive assistance, there is no guarantee of international intervention, particularly as these events

are occurring domestically and do not involve a MID. Military support is expected to have the most utility, as a minority with military capabilities becomes a far less attractive target to a state leader wary of casualties and becoming mired in a protracted conflict. Material support is expected to have an intermediate level of utility to the minority group—while not particularly useful for defense purposes, food, medicine, and other resources can be extremely useful in helping the minority to stave off displacement and the damaging effects of economic discrimination. An index of these three measures provides a comprehensive overview of the level of support for a minority group to determine its overall deterrent effect. A scale from [0] to [6] indicates the level of non-state international support that a minority group has: [0] for no observed non-state international support, [1] for political support, [2] for material support, and [3] for military support. Therefore, if a minority group receives political, material, and military non-state international support, they have the highest level of non-state actor international support possible, which is then coded as a [6]. This indexed variable then becomes an aggregate indicator of international non-state level support for the minority group.

To ensure that the political, military, and material components do in fact have different impacts and should be weighted differently, three control variables with measures of non-state actor political, material, and military support are run through the model as well, to ensure that these variables to do not perform better when measured on their own. These three control variables are derived from the MAR Database, and are coded binary, [0] representing no support of the given kind, and [1] representing its presence.

An argument to this variable is that there are many different kinds of non-state support a minority group from which a minority group can garner support, and therefore nearly all minority groups will receive at least some form of it. Indeed "non-state" is a broad term which the MAR Project (2007: 16) defines as, "…non-governmental organizations (e.g., the Red Cross, Amnesty International, Gates Foundation), but also include prominent individuals (e.g., Jimmy

Carter, Bono), religious organizations (e.g. The Catholic Church), and transnational criminal and terrorist organizations (e.g., al Qaeda)." With such a broad definition for non-state support, there is uncertainty present over *which* type of non-state support is most effective. In other words, it could be fairly argued that this variable operationalization is too reductive to be useful. Clearly receiving weapons and military supplies from Hizb'allah cannot be equated to receiving advocacy or famine relief supplies from the Red Cross. By indexing the variable, different types of support are accounted for in the same variable which helps ameliorate this problem. This variable could by differentiating between which type of non-state actor is providing the support, but this is outside the parameters of this article. For the purposes of this paper, a binary indication of non-state support will help to initially prove the presence of a correlation to diversionary violence.

Non-state actor international support for the minority group is expected to have a direct, positive relationship with the likelihood of diversionary violence. Thus, a high level of non-state actor support is expected to correlate to a higher likelihood of diversionary violence. Non-state actor support should have an impact on the final model but is expected to be less significant than the primary independent variables.

6. Foreign State-Level and IGO Support

Non-state actor support for minority groups is not constricted by economic and political pressures like foreign state-level and international governmental organization (IGO) support. However, states and international institutions like the UN generally have greater access to the resources necessary to aid a jeopardized minority group, though they may be hampered by the political drawbacks that intervention entails. Similar to non-state foreign support, state-level foreign support is measured as three variables: political, military, and material. State-level military support is expected to have the most impact, while material support is expected to be

more impactful than political support due to the same logic as "non-state actor support," namely, that a state in a dire enough economic situation to consider a diversionary attack is unlikely to be dissuaded from its course by foreign political action. Like international non-state support, this variable is constructed as an index of three measurements of support.

Traditionally, the causal logic behind this variable has been that foreign state support for a potential diversionary target acts as a deterrent, as the state leader would not want to risk and international intervention. Attacking a minority group with foreign state advocacy or military/material support carries even stronger international implications than ignoring a concerned NGO. However, as was observed during the Çiller administration, Turkish state leadership weighed the impact of reductions to their military support from the United States and other NATO partners against the benefits of continuing their conflict against the Kurds and chose to widen the conflict. This observation indicates that foreign state and IGO political support of the minority group was not enough to prevent the conflict. If state leadership are the political utility maximizers that diversionary war theory assumes them to be, then foreign state support of a minority group is not enough of a deterrent to prevent diversionary violence.

In fact, states with faltering economies or facing high levels of unpopularity may actually benefit from foreign state support of the minority group. If a state is attempting a rally around the flag effect to secure their hold on power, then the state will try the most expedient process available to engender nationalist sentiment. If a foreign state is supporting a minority group, then cries of foreign meddling in domestic affairs will only further the targeting state's agenda and enhance the persecutorial narrative they are building. In this way, the foreign state and IGO reaction to diversionary tactics may actually aid state leadership and encourage the continuation or repetition of this behavior. As much of the civil conflict literature describes, domestic conflicts most frequently occur in economically deprived and volatile countries (Tir and Jasinski 2008; Henderson and Singer 2000; Besancon 2005). States in this position, for the most part,

may determine through the diversionary calculus that they cannot attempt an economic recovery if they are no longer in power, therefore diversionary violence is worthwhile, even if it worsens domestic economic conditions.

This variable is measured in an identical scale to the non-state actor variable. Foreign state support is indexed from [0] to [6], indicating how much foreign state or IGO support is present for a minority group: [0] no foreign state or IGO support, [1] political support, [2] material support, and [3] military support. A minority group receiving political, material, and military foreign state or IGO support scores a [6], the highest possible measurement of support.

The foreign state or IGO support variable runs into a similar dilemma as the non-state actor support variable—building an index of support may mask interactions between different types of foreign state support because they weighted differently within the indexed variable. To control for this issue, just like the non-state actor support variable, individual measures for each type of foreign state or IGO support level are taken from the MAR Project Database and utilized in the final model. These interactions are then compared to the indexed variable to provide a comprehensive picture of foreign state or IGO support for a minority group's impact on the likelihood of violence occurring.

The indexed variable for foreign state or IGO support of a minority group is expected to have a direct, positive relationship with the likelihood of diversionary tactics being used. As the level of foreign state military, material, and political support increases, the easier it is for the state to construct a narrative in which the minority group has aligned with foreign interests to undermine the welfare of the nation. This variable follows a similar construction to non-state actor support, and individual measures for different types of support will be included as well. Foreign state and IGO support is expected to be impactful on the model, but be less significant than the main independent variables described above.

7. Kindred Group Support

While many minorities find support from kindred groups settled across a national border, there is nuance to the level of that support. Simply having distant relatives of a minority group settled in a different country is unlikely to offer the state much opportunity to build the scapegoating narrative, unless those kinship groups have enough influence in a foreign country to alter international opinion and make themselves known to the domestic base population. However, a kindred group with substantial economic and military strength, settled just across a national border from the regional base of a domestic minority group could provide considerable support to a domestic minority group. If a domestic minority group with this level of cross-border kinship support were to be targeted by the state, it may be easy for minority refugees as well as militia personnel or weapons and supplies to bleed across the border, limiting the effectiveness of the diversionary attempt.

The cross-border kin may also support any defensive effort mounted by the minority group, funneling supplies, weapons, and warfighters across the border, leading to a far more protracted struggle than originally intended by the state leadership, and perhaps deepening the financial predicament that was the impetus for the diversionary attempt. Describing the relationship between the PKK and KDP prior to 1985, Gunter (1996: 51) indicates that, "PKK militants being trained in Syrian and Lebanese camps were slowly moved to northern Iraq, where new camps were established." Locating the camps outside Turkey with the support of Kurdish kindred groups in Syria, Iraq and other countries allowed the PKK to continue their resistance movement with less fear of their training camps being destroyed by Turkish security forces.

Finally, if the transnational kin wield significant power in the neighboring state system, perhaps even being the majority across the border, there is a risk of internationalizing the conflict, which could draw in an international intervention. The varying levels kinship support may increase a minority group's likelihood of being targeted for diversionary violence, because

the state's narrative that the minority group is a threat becomes more credible as the level of transnational kinship support increases. Therefore, transnational kinship as a variable is structured as a scale, on which a low-level of cross-border kindred group support is unlikely to be increase the likelihood of targeting, but high levels of kindred support effectively augment the scapegoating narrative and therefore increases the risk of being targeted for diversionary violence.

This scale follows the same construction of the other two "support" variables as it is indexed from [0] to [6]. These measurements equate to the following: [0] no kindred support, [1] political support, [2] material support, and [3] military support. A minority group receiving political, material, and military kindred support scores a [6], the highest possible measurement of support. To control for the performance of each type of support outside the boundaries of the indexed variables, individual measurements for each of the three types of support are also accounted for in the model, providing an extra layer of detail in how much impact these variables have on the model. Just like the foreign state or IGO support variable and the non-state actor support variable, the individual measurements for kindred support are binary, coded as [0] no support and [1] support is present. Data for these measurements is derived from the MAR Dataset.

The kindred support variable faces challenges that the other two "support" variables do not, because geographic proximity could play an important factor in the strength of a kindred group. As discussed above, a minority group in a state which is concentrated near a powerful kindred group on the other side of a national border would theoretically be much less likely to be attacked by the state, as opposed to a minority group with limited kindred support, or kindred support which is several countries or more away. Using the example from the Kurdish Question case study, Kurdish diaspora groups far removed in Europe have been unable to provide more than indirect political support by pressuring their host nation's leadership to sanction Turkey or

utilize other, more diplomatic means of pressure. However, the population of Iraqi Kurdistan, which shares a mountainous border with the Kurdish Anatolian regions in southeast Turkey, were able to provide weapons, material support, and safe harbor to retreating PKK forces during the Kurdish offensives of the Özal and Çiller administrations, though the infighting between competing Kurdish militant groups does indicate that kindred support groups can cut both ways (Gunter 1996: 50-62). These uncomfortable dichotomies in the effectiveness of kindred support are difficult to bypass but ultimately unnecessary to address for the purposes of this article. As this analysis of domestic diversionary targeting is only interested in identifying a correlation between *any* kindred support and deterrence of diversionary violence, it is acceptable to index kindred support in a similar way to the other two support variables.

Kindred support level is expected to have a direct, positive relationship with the likelihood of a diversionary attempt. Thus, the more kindred support that a minority group receives, the more likely they are to be targeted. Kindred support level is expected to have a correlation to diversionary violence but is not expected to be as impactful as the primary independent variables: recent grievances, geographic concentration, economic discrimination, and protest level.

Hypotheses

In examining the forthcoming data, some trends should be apparent due to the causal mechanisms mentioned above. State leaders rarely reveal their entire motive for behavior and policy implementation. What is stated officially often does not represent the whole truth. If state leaders pursuing a diversionary conflict informed the population of the true purpose of a conflict against a minority group (a distraction from other, more pressing domestic problems), then there would be no real benefit to the diversion. It can therefore be safely assumed that the expressed motives of state leaders are deliberately inaccurate portrayals of this type of conflict. It can also

be assumed that the ingroup/outgroup interaction in domestic diversionary violence will require the outgroup to be weak enough to not represent an existential threat to the survival of the state. If it did, this scenario would not be representative of a diversionary war because the survival of the sovereign state is the fundamental concern of a nation, superseding economic performance or political cohesion.

Given the near impossibility of conclusively proving the motives of state leadership even with empirical evidence or firsthand accounts of events from within state administrations, the goal of this paper is not to provide objective proof that states engage in diversionary tactics. Rather, the aim is to establish a causal narrative and provide empirical evidence to support the theory that state leaders deliberately select one minority group for diversionary tactics over another, due to a specific set of conditions. While several determinants of diversionary target selection have been laid out here, it is beyond the bounds of this research to focus on all of them. Specifically, this article determines the impact of a history of grievances, minority geographic concentration, economic discrimination, minority protest level, international non-state support level, foreign state and IGO support level, and kindred group support. To prevent selecting on the dependent variable, observations in which minority groups which were *not* targeted in diversionary violence will also be analyzed. This has led to five hypotheses to evaluate the impact of these variables on target selection for domestic diversionary conflict.

Some of these variables are expected to be more impactful than others. Geographic concentration and history of grievances are expected to have the most effect, as they represent the areas of greatest political and military utility for state leadership and therefore the most frequently present in the targeting process. International non-state actor and foreign state support variables are expected to the least impactful, as by diversionary logic, if a diversionary attack takes place, it is because the state's economic situation is already desperate enough to warrant the cannibalization of domestic resources (military resources, political capital expended, damage to

infrastructure and economy). In this situation, the state is less likely to respond to international political pressure and may even use it to further the scapegoating narrative. These variables are divided into five hypotheses taking into account the seven independent variables whose impact it is the goal of this article to measure against the controls.

Hypothesis 1: *If a minority group has a significant history of recent grievances with the majority, then they are the most likely minority group in a state system to be the target of domestic diversionary violence.*

Hypothesis 2: *If a minority group has a high level of geographic concentration, they are more likely to be targeted for diversionary violence.*

Hypothesis 3: *If a minority group experiences a high level of economic discrimination, they are more likely to be targeted by diversionary violence.*

Hypothesis 4: *If a minority group is increasing its protest level, it is more likely to experience diversionary violence.*

Hypothesis 5: *If a minority group has a high level of external support from foreign state actors and IGOs, non-state international actors, or kindred groups abroad, they are less likely to be targeted for diversionary violence.*

The Measurements and the Model

Of the seven independent variables, multiple measurements were developed for four. Geographic concentration had two measurements, one focusing on the proportion of the minority group population settled within the regional base, and one focusing on the percentage of each minority group settled within a specific region. These measurements both captured the same dimension of the geographic concentration variable, and so each was included in the models to the exclusion of the other. Non-state actor support had four measurements: [1] measured non-

state actor political support, [2] material support, [3] military support, and [4] an index of those three measures. Foreign state and IGO support also had four measurements: [1] measured foreign state political support, [2] material support, [3] military support, and [4] an index of those three measures. Kindred support had four measurements as well: [1] measured kindred political support, [2] material support, [3] military support, and [4] an index of those three measures. Recent grievances, economic discrimination, and protest level had only one measurement each. Ultimately, including the measurements for the control variables, a total of 25 measurements factored into the design.

All the measurements for the seven independent variables were run through an ordered logistic regression to determine the optimal model. This model ended up as follows:

Polr(formula = DIV_VIOL_2005 ~ indexksup + indexnsasup + indexstamatsup + Recent.Grievance + GROUPCON + PROT + ECDIS, data = divers.data)

V. Results and Discussion

In this model, the variables performed as follows:

Coefficients	Value	Standard Error	T-value
Kindred Support Index	0.05165	0.1896	0.2725
Non-State Actor Support Index	-0.07898	0.1492	-0.5295
Foreign State/IGO Support Index	0.11223	0.1098	1.0222
Recent Grievances	1.84582	0.1939	9.5201
Minority Group Concentration	0.28635	0.1413	2.0271
Protest	-0.04054	0.0228	-1.7785
Economic Discrimination	0.11441	0.1090	1.0496

With all seven independent variables present in this model, the variables for recent grievances [9.52], minority group population concentration [2.027], and protest level [-1.779] expressed statistically significant t-value results. These t-values indicate a statistically significant relationship between minority group concentration, protest level, recent grievances, and the likelihood of a group being targeted for domestic diversionary conflict.

Interestingly, the protest variable displayed a negative t-value, indicating that the presence of protests actually reduces the likelihood of attack. There are several possible explanations for this. First, it seems plausible that if a minority group is already protesting, the state is already using repressive tactics to contain it—tactics which fall short of diversionary violence. It is furthermore plausible that as state leadership continues to build a narrative against a minority group in preparation for a diversionary attempt, the state benefits from allowing the minority to protest. If the minority is protesting and disrupting the economy, there is opportunity for the base population to start feeling resentment toward the minority. Finally, if multiple groups are protesting simultaneously in the country, the state may be devoting resources toward

repressing the unrest in the base population and therefore not have the resources on hand for a diversionary attempt (though it may be attempted later if the government fails to quell the unrest in the base population).

Recent grievance was the most statistically significant variable in the model, with a t-value of [9.52] indicating a strong correlation with the occurrence of diversionary violence. This variable's performance shows that recent repressive activity on behalf of the state (occurring the year prior to the diversionary tactic in 2005), had a clear impact on the likelihood of the minority group being targeted for diversionary purposes. This result confirms the expectations of the primary hypothesis of this article for a direct, positive relationship between the recent grievances variable and the dependent variable, as the presence of recent grievances in the form of repressive tactics used against a minority group drastically increases the likelihood of that group being targeted in the future.

The second highest performing variable was minority group concentration, which shows a statistically significant t-value of [2.027]. As per the second hypothesis laid out above, geographic concentration of the minority group seems to play a major role in its targeting by the state. While other contributions to the literature have focused on the state's military capabilities (Tir and Jasinski 2008), geographic concentration appears to be an important indicator of the state's ability to target a minority group. This is a fairly intuitive argument—a state with limited military capabilities will utilize those resources in the most efficient way possible. Thus, a more concentrated group is more likely to be targeted because their concentration limits the need to spread military forces across multiple regions of the state.

Of the main independent variables, the one that performed the poorest was economic discrimination. In the final model, economic discrimination only had a t-value of [1.045], which is far below the level for statistical significance. It was expected that this variable would have a strong correlation to the dependent variable, because economic discrimination seemed a logical

intermediary step before more violent repressive and diversionary tactics occur. However, the results provide no support for this hypothesis. This may be because economic discrimination is not an effective use of resources in a diversionary attempt—the state would rather use more grandiose, visually diversionary methods to divert popular attention, such as conflict, which is more easily televised. Intermediary variables may also mask the impact of this variable: in an economic downturn, which occurs in every case of diversionary violence, it is possible that the discrimination against the minority group becomes less visible as the economic disparity is lessened. In other words, as the entire country loses capital and employment, their economic deprivation levels begin to match the minority group which was already experiencing economic discrimination. Whether intervening factors or the state deciding to utilize other repressive tactics prior to a diversionary tactic were the cause, economic discrimination has little impact on the diversionary targeting process.

Kindred support fell far below the threshold for statistical significance. In the best performing model, this variable only reached a t-value of [0.273], going against this article's expectation that kindred support played an important role in the diversionary process. The indexed kindred support variable was run first, and after statistical significance was not achieved in any model, the three other individualized variables for kindred group political, material, and military support were run both together and separately in the models to see if any gained statistical significance. While several of these individualized variables performed better than a t-value of [0.273] in other models, there was no model where these variables were statistically significant.

There are several possible explanations for the kindred group support measurements' underperformance. The first and most evident is that kindred support may not be significant because a state utilizing diversionary tactics is already desperate enough to maintain its hold on power that they are willing to risk a diversionary attempt, no matter how much extra support is

provided by the kindred group. Though the relationship between this variable and the likelihood of a diversionary attempt did follow the direction hypothesized, indicating that state leadership may use the kindred support to fortify the scapegoating narrative and rally the base population, the relationship was too far below statistical significance to warrant any in-depth discussion of its ramifications. Furthermore, the dataset for this study may have been adversely affected by data only being available for the year 2005. Unfortunately, the MAR Project Database only contains observations for the necessary variables from the years 2004-2006, and the SPEED Civil Unrest Database only contains data up until the year 2005 (Minorities at Risk Project 2009; Nardulli et al. 2015). Viewed in a larger dataset over multiple years or even decades, this variable may become more viable. Finally, as discussed in the operationalization section, this variable does not differentiate between different types of kindred support, whether diaspora-based or close-border kinship bonds. If the former, there is a logical limit on how much support the kindred group can be reasonably expected to provide. If the latter, support may be more substantial but simply not observed in the year 2005. A more specific operationalization of this variable may reveal that kindred support level is a substantial indicator of diversionary violence occurring. Whatever the reason, it is clear that this variable has no statistically significant effect on the dependent variable.

A similar fate befell the non-state actor support variable. While this variable performed slightly better than the kindred group support variable with a t-value of [-0.523], it still did not achieve statistical significance. The direction of this variable's relationship to the dependent variable indicates a direct, negative relationship and not the direct, positive relationship expected in the hypotheses. This may indicate that the causal logic for this variable is incorrect and that as the level of non-state actor support increases, the likelihood of attack decreases. However, the variable's performance falls so below the level of statistical significance that it is not worth conjecturing about in any great detail, despite the direction of this relationship not matching what

was predicted in the hypothesis. The other individualized variables measuring specific non-state political, military, or material support were also passed through the model, but all failed to achieve statistical significance.

It was expected that non-state actor support would be less impactful on the model than kindred support or foreign state actor or IGO support. While this variable is actually slightly more impactful than kindred support, both variables are statistically insignificant, therefore the theoretical underpinnings of this article should not be reevaluated to reflect the slightly more relevant but still not significant impact of non-state actor support. There are two reasons why this variable was not statistically significant. First, it seems clear that the expectation that non-state actor support would be less important than other factors was correct, but its impact was still overestimated. The hypothesis contends that while less impactful than other forms of support, non-state actor support would still be statistically significant. According to the best performing model's results, this variable has no statistical significance and thus no impact on the dependent variable.

The final independent variable measured was foreign state or IGO support level. Of the "support" variables, this one was expected to return the most impactful results. While it did indeed express a higher t-value score at [1.022] than non-state actor support or kindred support level, it still did not achieve statistical significance. The three individual measures of foreign state or IGO military, political, and material support were also utilized in a variety of models to see which interactions produced statistical significance, though these variables did not achieve significance in any of the models run. Its t-value was positive, indicating that its relationship with the dependent variable matched what was expected—in other words, foreign state support for a minority group increases its chances of being targeted for diversionary purposes. However, as this variable did not reach statistical significance, the direction of the relationship between it and the dependent variable cannot be considered as vindication of the expectation in the

hypothesis. However, if conjecture were to be permitted, there is an intuitive causal logic behind this result, even if it is beyond the parameters of this article to confirm these suspicions: states with minority groups heavily influenced by foreign state actors or IGOs are more likely to target that group as they present an accessible scapegoating narrative, while states in an economic downturn that lack international financial benefactors are more likely to prioritize their popularity within a domestic base.

VI. Conclusion

The 2014 Russian invasion of the Crimean Peninsula and Eastern Ukraine, The Second Chechen War of 1999-2009, the multiple Turkish incursions into Syria as part of the ongoing Rojava Conflict, the ongoing Rohingya Genocides in Myanmar, and even the recent war posturing between the United States and Iran beginning in January, 2020 all have important markers of domestic diversionary conflicts. The prevalence and scale of ongoing conflicts worldwide demonstrates the necessity of continued research into diversionary violence. The refined target selection model developed in this article and the new research pathways it reveals promise deeper insight into the diversionary process. Understanding *who* is most likely to be targeted by this type of violence, as well as *why* they are at risk is essential in predicting and perhaps preventing or lessening the severity of diversionary tactics. More research is required before specific policy recommendations can be extrapolated from the data analyzed here, but the necessity of diversionary target selection as a model in the diversionary literature has been established.

While diversionary war literature is quite broad, research into its domestic applications has been limited. For this reason, this article opens new avenues for research into the field, based on the opportunities provided by the wider set of potential variables surveyed in its quantitative analysis. The variables selected were chosen based not on their relevance to past diversionary war literature, but in the context of a real-world example of diversionary violence, commonly referred to as the "Kurdish Question." The variables measured were thus consistent with more real-world observations than those present in the majority of contributions to the diversionary war literature.

Several avenues for future research persist. Though this article lays out the conditions under which a domestic minority group may be targeted by diversionary violence, it does not

identify which conditions render a diversionary attempt successful. While this article evaluated the deterrence value of foreign state support for a minority group, the impact of an outside, influential state encouraging a diversionary attempt is also still in question. Finding evidence of this dynamic could provide a better understanding of the deterrent value of foreign state support. While this article exclusively analyzed the conditions that lead to diversionary *violence* occurring, it seems intuitive that states would first attempt other, less expensive and destructive diversions first. The diversionary model could benefit from analyzing the impact of cultural suppression, restriction of voting rights, and other repressive tactics on the diversionary targeting model. It also remains unclear why a higher level of protest correlates to a lower likelihood of being targeted for diversionary violence. The kindred support level variable may have underperformed because kindred support is more nuanced than expressed in this article. A deeper analysis of competition and the outbidding process that takes place within ethnic minority groups may shed more light on the conditions in which kindred group support is withheld during a diversionary attempt. As described in the case of the Çiller administration, there is a lack of clarity regarding whether a threshold exists beyond which the state considers further diversionary violence to be a net negative given the economic damage it can wreak. Finally, with the promise of new, more detailed data available from the familiar Minorities at Risk Database and SPEED Civil Unrest Database in the near future, more data could certainly be extracted from this analysis to further the understanding of the diversionary process and its domestic applications.

This article determines that the presence of recent grievances in the form of repressive tactics used against a specific minority, higher population concentration of the minority group population within a region, and lower levels of protest amongst the minority group increased the chances of that minority group being targeted by the state for diversionary purposes. Other variables, such as kindred support level, foreign state or IGO support level, and non-state actor

support level for the minority groups were shown to have little to no effect on the state's decision to target a minority group in this manner.

Appendix: Proportional Odds Logistics Regression Model Summary

```
> library(MASS)
> divers.data$DIV_VIOL_2005<-factor(DIV_VIOL_2005)
> model.main<-
polr(DIV_VIOL_2005~indexKSUP+indexNSASUP+indexSTAMATSUP+Recent.Grievan
ce+GROUPCON+PROT+ECDIS,data = divers.data)
> summary(model.main)

Re-fitting to get Hessian
Call:
polr(formula = DIV_VIOL_2005 ~ indexKSUP + indexNSASUP + indexSTAMATSUP +
    Recent.Grievance + GROUPCON + PROT + ECDIS, data = divers.data)

Coefficients:
                   Value Std. Error t value
indexKSUP        0.05165     0.1896  0.2725
indexNSASUP     -0.07898     0.1492 -0.5295
indexSTAMATSUP   0.11223     0.1098  1.0222
Recent.Grievance 1.84582     0.1939  9.5201
GROUPCON         0.28635     0.1413  2.0271
PROT            -0.04054     0.0228 -1.7785
ECDIS            0.11441     0.1090  1.0496

Intercepts:
    Value   Std. Error t value
0|1  2.8315  0.4569     6.1973
1|2  3.8979  0.4908     7.9415

Residual Deviance: 371.6072
AIC: 389.6072
```

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